1603. But they have been informed that my philosophical works were nothing else but certain ideas delivered in very simple terms, as when I say that "subject and predicate" means this: that "predicates," or things predicated, must be applied to what is meant by a "subject." For example, when something in the prophets is under consideration, this can be applied to some article of belief, to faith, to the human mind, the very inward as well as the inward one, to the Church, to heaven. Thus whatever is taken up or understood is called the subject, and the other things that are said and are applicable are called predicates, so the predicates are to be applied to the subject. This same thing can also be expressed differently, without such words, and be likewise understood, and later spoken. So they are nothing but true ideas couched in such formulas and terms, being thus a kind of philosophic language, more precise than other language, for otherwise the same matter would have to be expressed by roundabout ways, customary with those unacquainted with those terms-and in fact more clearly, unless the terms spring from the subjects themselves. It is the same in regard to other inquiries, such as what "form" is, what "quality" is, and the like, which are only mental images of truths, useful to those who want to express inward, and very inward things by shortcuts.